

Jerusalem at the beginning of the twentieth century

Spatial Continuity and Social Fragmentation

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MIT

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Spatial Continuity and Social Fragmentation

'We must establish our presence in the East

not politically but through the church...

While our influence was still strong we could afford to conceal our activities

and thus avoid envy, but now our influence in the East has weakened we,

on the contrary, must try to display ourselves so that we do not sink

in the estimation of the Orthodox population...

Jerusalem is the center of the world and our mission must be there"

1858 Russian Foreign Ministry memorandum¹

In Jerusalem, modernity started in the ninth day of December 1917, when the British forces commanded by the (future Sir) Allenby entered the city, ending the more than four hundred years of Ottoman rule. Until then, the univocal mapping of national institutions with territorial boundaries was foreign to the Holy City. At the end of the nineteenth century, Jerusalem was –once more- the site where Civic and Religious, Eastern and Western powers met. The city,

¹ In Wasserstein, pp. 60

whose holiness was beyond temporal claims, was both the end of the contest and the mean to symbolize the legitimacy of the conqueror.

The period that preceded the full imposition of the National State logic in the city was marked by a different arrangement of people, institutions and territory. It is through the study of the interaction of these three, that I try to capture the complexity of the notion of citizenship during nineteenth-century in Jerusalem. First, to understand which was its configuration under the Ottoman Empire. Then, how this citizenship-model interacted with European States. Finally, to search for the traces of these relations in the spatial configuration of the city.

I have chosen this particular moment in the Jerusalem history because it was the last occasion when her institutions and residents did not operate in reference to a binary system of identity. The deep and antagonist separation of Jews-Israelis and Muslim-Palestinians that we face today, is spatially localized on the basis left by the British mandate. It was then when a congruency between religious identity and political jurisdiction was established as a criterion for dividing Jerusalem. Since that period, both Jews and Palestinians have found their life bound to specific and exclusive locations. This is why I want to look once more to the very beginning of the twenty-century, before the modern nationalistic

narratives were imposed to the organization of the city; to explore how a texture of identities work, to look for alternative possibilities that can alter the traditional hierarchies between the City and the State.

The Capitulations

National sovereignty, the notion of a univocal correspondence among people, land and legal institutions is a defining characteristic of the Western modern State. However, this connection was not present in early times. The indivisible bond between nationality and religion –as was conceived before the European governments separated God from Government and Church from State- was attained through letting nationality flow beyond territorial boundaries.

Extraterritoriality, the legal form by which nationals of one country could be judged by their own law when residing in foreign land- was not uncommon in the Byzantine days. In order to encourage and organize commerce among people obeying to different laws (and Gods), the principle of extraterritoriality was often applied among European governments². Varangians merchants in the

² Lucius Ellsworth Thayer, The Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire and the Questions of its Abrogation as it Affects the United States. The American Journal of International Law. Vol., 17, No 2 (Apr 1923) 207-233.

Byzantine Empire (904 treaty) and English merchants in the Russian Empire (1555), for example, were judged accordingly to the law of their own country, regardless of the physical location of their acts. *“If a Russian should seek to steal from anyone in our Empire, the punishment for this act shall be severe; and if the theft has already been committed, twice the value of the stolen object shall be paid by him. Likewise, the rule is applicable to the Greeks in their relation with Russia and, furthermore, the guilty person shall be punished in accordance with the laws of his own country”*³

The Ottoman Empire’s adoption of this principle of ‘law-attached-to-subject’ was reasonable in the XV century context. “Capitulations’ -the name of this specific model of extraterritorial privileges- was the ideal way to deal with the religious requirement of limiting Ottoman nationality only to true-Islam-believers⁴. By using this non-territorial system, commercial exchange with Westerners was made feasible. Otherwise, foreign merchants would have not accepted to reside within the empire; since according to Ottoman law, an infidel had no right for

³ Article IV of the 944 A.D. treaty between Byzantine emperors and Russian Varangians, as cited by Thayer (1923)

⁴ Only in 1869 some no-Muslim subject were considered under Turkish laws.

property and is not worthy of legal protection. Thanks to the ‘Capitulations’ arrangement, the Ottoman Empire found a way to have international relations without breaking its own laws.

As long as European nations kept a similar blurriness between legal and religious institutions and nationality, the ‘Capitulations’ proved reasonable successful. However, after the Peace of Westphalia, when modern European nations abandoned the principle of extraterritoriality in favor of the enforcement of local laws in correspondence to country’s boundaries; the Ottoman power was weakened. Under these treaties⁵, foreign nationals were given special benefits when in the empire jurisdictions; but since legal systems were substantially unequal in Europe, no reciprocity was established. Eventually, this ended up hurting Ottoman Government ability to dominate its own territory. It was only in 1914, when Turkey entered the First World War as an ally of German and Austro-Hungarian powers, that Capitulations were officially rejected⁶.

⁵ Thayer enumerates the following treaties, so called “capitulations”: Italian cities (1540), Sardinia Treaty (1740), France (1535), Austria (1625), England (1675), Holland (1680), Sweden (1737), Denmark (1746), Prussia (1761), Bavaria (1870), Spain (1782), Russia (1783), United States (1830), Belgium (1838), Hanse Cities (1839), Portugal (1843), Greece (1855) and Brazil (1858).

⁶ “*Sir: I have the honor to inform you that by Imperial Irade the Ottoman government has abrogated as from the first of October next the conventions known as the Capitulations restricting the sovereignty of*

Jerusalem under the Ottoman Powers

The particularities of the population residing in Jerusalem did not escape the attention of the Ottoman Government. As a response to the demands that a large number of foreigners –residents, missionaries and diplomats- imposed on the local administration, Jerusalem was given a special status. In 1874, while the rest of Palestinian districts were still administered from Beirut, the Holy City was to be governed by an exclusive *mutassarraf*. Foreign residents were an extra challenge for Ottoman control not because of their power, but because of their weakness. Being mostly part of religious communities or charity institutions, they deserved foreign nations' tutelage. Under the umbrella of the Capitulation treaties, European countries took advantage of this condition to stamp their foot on Jerusalem land.

One of the most controversial issues in the Jerusalem administration was the increased flow of Jewish immigration, which was formally prohibited since the early 1880's. However, since Jewish people were foreign nationals this

Turkey in its relations with certain Powers. All privileges and immunities accessory to these conventions or issuing therefore are equally repealed. Having thus freed itself from what was an intolerable obstacle to all progress in the Empire, the Imperial government has adopted as the basis of its relations with the other Powers the principles of International Law” Note submitted by the Turkish Ambassador to the United States Secretary of State on September 1914. On Thayer (1923)

prohibition was highly ineffective; in practice they were allowed to enter Palestine and stay under the protection of foreign consuls. Not only religious, but also political reasons were behind this prohibition. Within this legal regime, the increased number of Jewish population was likely to be used by European States to increase their own influence in Jerusalem. The same countries that disliked the presence of Jews in their own territories were happy to rise as their protectors when in Palestine. The situation was perceived to be so harmful to local Government that one of the Governors of Jerusalem –Tevfik Bey- (1897-1901) sent a letter to Istanbul proposing to force Jewish people to accept Ottoman nationality. The idea was to prevent European nations from taking advantage of being their protectors, because *‘if total prohibition proved impossible, one should at least try to find the means to reduce the damage and harness Jewish power for Ottoman interest’*.⁷

This ‘protector role’ was central in British policy in Palestine. In the middle of XIX century, as a reaction to France being the protector of the Catholics (Latins) and Russia looking after the Christian Orthodox Church; England wanted to

⁷ Quote of Resid (the Governor who followed Tevfik Bey) as appeared in Kushner pp. 87.

fortify her own position by being the guardian of the Jewish people.⁸ However, since many of the Jews residing in Jerusalem were Russians émigrés, both Ottoman and Russian authorities objected to British policy. No European State wanted to lose the strategic advantage of having nationals in Jerusalem land that could justify its presence there.

After a series of diplomatic conflicts, by 1890 England had to limit her 'protection activities' only to those Jewish residents who were also British nationals. The extent to which this extraterritorial powers in Jerusalem were used as political leverage is reflected in a 1914 irony. Almost twenty-five years before the Second World War, Germany –allied to Turkey in the First World War and with no territorial claims over Palestine, become the official protector of Jewish people in the Holy Land.

⁸ *“The European powers did not strive for territorial controls in Palestine but for ‘influence’. The easiest way to establish ‘influence was the policy of ‘protection’ of religious minorities. The Russians already has the Orthodox Christians and the French had the Catholics to ‘protect’. To draw even, England and Prussia (later Germany) has to find or create their own minorities to be ‘protected’. From 1839 the British took the Jews under their wing, and a small Protestant community was created by way of conversion. The policy of religious-cultural penetration and of ‘religious protectorates’ thus made Jerusalem an arena of European rivalries”*

From Alexander Schölch “19th Century”, cited by Dumnper in ‘The Politics of Jerusalem since 1967’

European nations designs over Jerusalem land were not an opportunistic outcome of Turkish weakness. Even after the legal separation of State and Church was fully incorporated in national laws, States found a justification for their action in the protection of religious values. The name of ‘Christendom’ was the sword of territorial powers. In the (supposed secular) voice of a 1857 editorial note in The New York Times reads: *“To this immense territory [of the Ottoman Empire], and with this heterogeneous people, the commercial States of the world are obliged to resort and deal; are obliged to maintain intimate intercourse, and send thither agents and traders. The religious sentiment of Christendom cannot refrain from attempting the re-evangelization of the countries sanctified by the life and death of the great founder. A vast mass of the population are Christians, and they have strong affinities and sympathies with the churches of surrounding States. Thus every interest, sacred and secular, is involved in the preservation of order in the Ottoman Empire”*⁹

Governing the city:

It is interest for us to look at how the Ottoman Empire managed to govern under such conditions, with more than one third of its residents being ‘legally

⁹ The New York Times, New York. July, 30th.1858 ‘Dissolution of the Ottoman Rule’.

protected' by foreign nations¹⁰, and many of them economically inactive, surviving thanks to external donations –people whose reason for existence was just to be physically present in Jerusalem. In their own eyes' to preach in the Holiest place on earth, in some European States eyes' to embody territorial claims.

The duality of actors, actual residents and 'residents protectors", implied that competition for city space happened at two different -yet interconnected- levels: diplomacy and daily life. Foreign institutions advanced their interests through consulates who relied on diplomatic conventions; by using their legal rights they sought access to the territory. The approach of city residents was inverse; through the actual appropriation of the territory they looked for ways to institutionalize their rights.

Given that transactions and taxations over property involving non-Ottoman residents were done through consular offices, secular life was difficult to manage. However, the main concern of Jerusalem authorities was "sacred-life";

¹⁰ According to Wasserstein, in 1910, out of 69,900 residents in Jerusalem, there were 12,000 Jews and 12,900 Christians.

since any conflict could easily be converted into an international affair. Much of the daily task of Jerusalem Government was to mediate in the residents' struggles for occupation of the sacred sites of the city. In most of the cases, what the parties contested was not the sanctity of a site, but the right of the other to be there. But although all groups claimed exclusive legitimacy, their incapacity to either renounce or to impose themselves, made negotiations their forced path of action

The people of Jerusalem at the beginning of the twentieth century did not identify themselves simply as Christians, Muslims or Jewish; they constructed their religious identity with zealotry and specificity. Latins, Franciscans, Greek Orthodoxes, Russian Orthodoxes, Armenians, Syrians, Jacobites, Copts, Abyssinians, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Arabs, Muslims, Sunis, Turks, Bedouins, Ashkenazies, Yemenites, Bagdadim, Persians, Karaim and Sephardims, among other acted as distinct groups in their daily demands for Jerusalem spaces¹¹. In

¹¹ "Before the Zionist came-we had more than 45,000 Jews in Jerusalem divided into six sections –the Sepharaidim of Spanish origins; the Ashkenazim chiefly of German, Polish and Russian extraction; the Jews of Yemen, Arabia; the Jews of Aleppo, Damascus and Bagdad, the Gurgeee, Persian and Bokhari Jews from the Caucasus, Persia and Turkestan, and the Karaim, Karaites from the Crimea. Every section had its separate organization and no representation in the local government because they were not united" Quoted by T. Walter Williams in the New York Times July 10, 1921 "Palestine is Still a Land of Problems. Moslems and Christians bitterly opposed to Colonization by Zionist Immigrants"

addition, their religious identity was crisscrossed by different nationalities. Holy City residents responded to different earthly laws, mainly the codes of Turkey, France, Britain, Germany, Greece, Russia, Italy or United States were used to judge their actions.

Jerusalem governors had a double pressure when administering the city, on one hand they had to respond to Istanbul and to the Muslim world. On the other, they had to manage the pressure of European consuls, who were quick to object any partiality against their constituencies –either national or religious-. In terms of the holy sites, most of the conflicts derived from questioning who deserved to be in which sanctuary. Given their constrains, Jerusalem Governors approach did not rely on open coercion but on shrewd management. Three distinct strategies characterized their conflict over sacred spaces: use of a third neutral, double deals, and attenuation.

The use of a ‘third neutral’ served to deal with the contestation over spaces when parties share more similarities amongst themselves than with the third –neutral- party. An example of this approach took place during Easter ceremony, when different Christian groups would not accept to cede a religious-privilege to each other. In order to avoid conflict among them, a Muslim family guarded the keys

of the Holy Sepulchre. In the same fashion, the windows of the Church of the Nativity were not cleaned by a devoted Christian but by an Ottoman employee; and when Copts and Abyssinians conflicted, a Catholic was the mediator. In other cases, such as in the cleaning of the Holy Sepulchre steps, it was fear of this same practice –a non-Christian performing a Holy Christian task- that compelled different parties to negotiate a solution among themselves.

The second strategy, the double-deal, consisted in convincing each side that the Government was favoring their cause. One way to do this was to let one party have its rights publicly legitimized, while allowing the other to actually enjoy them. For example, this was the procedure in the dispute of Latins and Greeks over the use of the Church of the Nativity passageway. The legitimacy on their demands was recognized to the former; but the actual permit of use to the later. Another slight variation on this approach was when the right to a certain passage was given to the Copts, and then Abyssinians¹² received exclusivity over a new path to the same area.

It seems that when either of the former approaches were applied, the Jerusalem government did not itself feel threatened. The situation was different when a

¹² As related by Kushner on Tevfik Government in Jerusalem.

European consulate backed these claims. In those cases, the contestation over city spaces was not perceived as a challenge to city order but rather as a way to undermine Ottoman authority over Jerusalem. Attenuation was a way to avoid having an urban conflict be transformed into a diplomatic one. For example, Copts and Abyssinians were in constant conflict, but when Copts decided to become closer to British influence, Jerusalem Governor –Selma Ekrem– suggested to giving them all Ottoman honors –so as to avoid them to be candidates for England protection. This rationale closely resembles the suggestion to give Jewish residents Ottoman nationality, if their illegal immigration could not be prevented.

Not only Britain was sought ways to enlarge her influence in Jerusalem, other nations were also looking for ways to legitimize their presence in the city. Eventually, the Ottoman Government was unable to resist European powers and pulled out of Jerusalem. However, it is possible that it lasted longer than its own weakness would suggest, precisely because of this contestation among Westerners. European nations were jealously guarding each other, never allowing any one of them to be too empowered in the city. When Russia wanted to become the protector of the Orthodox, the Greeks protested; and although France managed to be the protector of the Latins, the Italians, the Vatican and

the Franciscan were continuously challenging her right. It is not a coincidence that Jerusalem was taken by the “West” only after the Great Powers’ alliance during the First World War.

The Holy Places.

Thinking through the dynamics of this period, when Jerusalem was a single jurisdiction with a multiplicity of nationalities and ethnicities, –each one responding to a different legal constellation-, one wonders how the space of the city reflected this interaction. How did the European States –highly aware of national spatial boundaries- managed to operate under the logic of extraterritoriality, while still struggling for spaces of exclusive territoriality? For the Ottoman Empire, national and religious identity were one; for France, Britain, Russia, Italy and Germany, at the beginning of the twenty century this belief was a powerful confounder through which they introduced their nationalistic interests in the midst of the city.

In Jerusalem, all claims are old, but none is older than the city itself. The contestation is over legitimacy of the actors, not the holiness of the stage. Hence, the space is fixed and demography is manipulated. The identity games that diplomacy played filtered into the architecture of the city. The Old City

composed by four quarters and circumvented by a rocky wall, could not be divided neither completely unified.

The footprint of the Old City at the beginning of the twenty-century dated from the “Aelia Capitolina” time (AD 135-324), when Hadrian first destroyed the city and then rebuilt it after the Roman camp model. The courses of the wall – reconstructed during the Ottoman period- are located almost in the same place as the Roman ones. Inside of them, Hadrian traced a North-South road (Cardo) and the East-West Road (Decumanus). During the Crusader Kingdom, these roads were used to mark four quarters: Syrian, German, Armenian and Patriarch. Later, these same spaces were to be named the Muslim, Jewish, Armenian and Christian quarters.

This practice of destruction and reconstruction, and of reoccupation and renaming of city structures was not limited to these neighborhoods. With each new regime, the city received new temples and new names for the older ones. When Romans conquered the city, they built a Temple for Jupiter in the middle of the Jewish Temple, at the east side of the Wailing Wall. And when Moslems conquered Jerusalem in the seventh-century, they renamed the area Haramesh-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary) and built a series of minarets within it. In the eleven-

century, Crusaders called it Templum Domini and added the Baptisterium, the Temple Convent and the Templus Salomonis. It was in the thirteen century, with the Mameluks administration, that the religious compound received its current name: Dome of the Rock.

When the Ottoman Empire conquered Jerusalem (1517), they restored the Dome of the Rock to its full splendor and replaced its windows and decorations with those of the Suleiman aesthetic. They had considerable power over the city, and managed to transform many of the Churches and Temples into Mosques. However, when its own powers started to decline, Western nations began to set a firmer foot in Holy Land. They did not limit then themselves to protectorate existing religious non-Muslims institutions, they also built new structures for their own creed.

European nations pressured to occupy further space In Jerusalem (as well as local government increasing weakness) could be seen in how they encroached over the green belt that ran between the city walls and the old buildings. A continuous strip of open space in all sites but that of the Dome of the Rock; by the middle of the nineteenth century began to be filled by new houses in the Jewish quarter, and by the Convent and the Church of Saint Saviour and the

Latin Patriarche in the Christian one. Even outside the Old City, the pressure to occupy the space was growing. Russians built the Sainte Mary Magdalena Church and a huge religious compound on the Mount of Olives, and Germans founded a Lutheran Church next to the Holy Sepulchre. Jewish immigrants established themselves just outside of the city walls; in what later would be the Nachlat-Shiva and the ultra-orthodox Mea-Shearim Jewish quarter¹³. The result of these expansions was an even denser, yet more subdivided net of sacred territories in the city.

The closure

This world of mischievous diplomacy was far too fragile to resist the pressures of an international war. When the different sides felt that they had more to gain through military than through consulates, negotiation was replaced by open confrontation. The Ottoman Empire allied with Germany, while the rest of European nations were drawing maps of their Holy Land share, as *'hunters who*

¹³ When the British forces occupy the city in 1917; even before the fight was finished, they called the expert help of Alexandria City Engineer and later, in 1922 of Sir Patrick Geddes to propose a plan for Jerusalem. The recommendation was consistent: Preserve Jerusalem's medieval character; and surround its wall by a belt of open space.

*divided up the skin of the bear before they killed it*¹⁴. Still unclear about who would eventually (after the defeat of the Ottoman Government) govern Jerusalem. Not only France and England were in the list, but also the Pope was suggested by the German Kaiser. In 1917 England began their mandate and made public the Balfour Declaration *'to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine'*. One year later, the Vatican proposed a Belgian for the government, since *'politically Belgium is unable to overshadow anybody'*.¹⁵

This extreme contestation and instability deeply affected the life in the city. In the late times of the Ottoman Empire, the living conditions in Jerusalem were seriously deteriorated. Water and hygiene were scarce: malaria, cholera, dysentery and scarlet fever were affected more than one fourth of the population; the infant mortality was tremendously high and trachoma was common among locals¹⁶. As travelers to Palestine described, it was not rare to

¹⁴ Quoted of a British War Office, in Wasserstein in "Divided Jerusalem". P74

¹⁵ Quoted from Sergio Minervi, *The Vatican and Zionism: Conflict in the Holy Land 1895-1925* (New York 1990. In Wasserstein, pp. 75

¹⁶ 'Dr Silverman sees crisis in Palestine 'Turkey's Declaration of War Has Removed the Last Source of Income for Jews There. *New York Time*, New York. November 9, 1914.

see blind people wandering around, with no particular direction, constantly murmuring prayers in the heart of the Holy City.

What can we conclude from this particular pattern of identity, power and place? Did this multi-fragmented space and discontinuity between law and territory protected the city from ethnic conflicts, or just delayed them in relation to the city to an even worse outcome? Was the city's misery connected to its inability to move beyond its inherited sacredness, or was precisely that fixity in the past what preserved Jerusalem over the centuries?

It is hard to provide an answer to these questions; or at least to establish a line of causality. However, some observations about this case could be useful for tracing alternative configurations for Jerusalem future. The first one is to distinguish between conflict among city residents, and the use of residents to dispute conflicts about the city (or beyond). The second one is that dependency on institutions independent from the city comes at a very high price: residents of Jerusalem were deprived of their resources when the First War began; and excluded from participating in the decision process when the moment to choose a new government came. The third one is that national powers rely on negotiation only when they cannot fully impose their sovereignty. The last one is

that, although Jerusalem story is marked by wars over identity, there were more times when these different identities found a way to live along side by side in the city, and in that history there is hope.

December 9th, 1917.

British troops in Jerusalem under General Allenby command. They dismount before entering the city, as a sign of their acknowledgement of its holiness.

General Allenby telegram to King George I

“The capture of Jerusalem has been in some degree delayed in consequence of the great care which has been taken to avoid damage to sacred places in and around the city.”

King George I response

“The news of the occupation of Jerusalem will be received throughout my Empire with the greatest satisfaction, and I heartily congratulate you and all the ranks on their success.

...I rejoice to think that by skilful dispositions you have preserved intact the holy place.”

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New York Times, July 30th, 1858

Dissolution of the Ottoman Rule.
From the Times, 1858. Original in the New York Times, July 30, 1858. Original Historical Newspaper The New York Times.

Dissolution of the Ottoman Rule.

The symptoms of the sick man, upon whose dying moments the Czar Nicholas was prepared to wait, have become really serious. The invalid is seized with convulsions. From every corner of the Empire comes the story of insurrection, barbarity and bigotry, to which the Christian population is exposed, notwithstanding the several firmans granting them peculiar immunities. The life of the British Consul in Belgrade is attempted; the Christians of Bosnia are in instant danger; the armies of the Porte overhang Montenegro; the English and French Consuls in Arabia the Happy, are murdered with a throng of their countrymen; the Island of Candia is the scene of a war of extermination between the two religions; the tribes of Upper Syria are on the verge of revolt; the remote province of Bagdad is in a state of rebellion, which the presence of OMAN PACHA, with a powerful army, can alone be expected to quell. Thus, while the Mussulman population is hastening to satisfy its vindictive prejudices against the Christian, the Sultan finds more than sufficient employment for his armies in preserving order in quarters where the religious question is not involved, and is thus powerless to enforce his own tolerant decrees. Add to this infirmity a hopeless exhaustion of the Ottoman treasury, and we certainly have a congeries of symptoms which can scarcely prove otherwise than fatal.

A noteworthy peculiarity of the case lies in the circumstance that every leading Power of Christendom is directly interested in these internal questions. Even the Government of the United States has its reclamation for an instance of religious animosity, in which Mr. Don, an American citizen in Syria, figured the other day. The consultation over the sick bed brings all mankind together; each with his prescription, each with his private end to serve, an end to be best served by the end of the Ottoman sway in Europe. To this formula the majority of opinions point. The Government of Constantinople is too weak to govern its wide and turbulent empire. Its arms are too short and slack to reach from the Adriatic to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The attempt to control a region so vast, and a population so immissible, with resources so paltry, is an insane pretence, which every event in the recent history of Islam tends to present in a stronger light. But to this immense territory, and with this heterogeneous people, the commercial States of the world are obliged to resort and deal; are obliged to maintain intimate intercourse, and send thither their agents and traders. The religious sentiment of Christendom cannot refrain from attempting the re-evangelization of the countries sanctified by the life and death of the great founder. A vast mass of the population are Christians, and they have strong affinities and sympathies with the churches of surrounding States.

Thus every interest, sacred and secular, is involved in the preservation of order in the Ottoman empire, and yet as matters are at present conducted, not one of those interests is safe. The lives of the missionary and teacher are less secure there than upon any other field of exertion. The property and life of the trader are in perpetual jeopardy. The scientific or commercial traveler is never guaranteed against the bigot and the brigand. The Christian population is exposed ever and again to massacre and persecution. Stretched across the highway of nations, the Ottoman rule endangers the safety of commerce, and violates the rights and safety of mankind precisely where they should be most amply guaranteed, and, therefore, is a fair subject for external intervention and correction.

The form which the reformation ought properly to assume is easily determined. It is high time that a new principle were introduced into international law, to the effect that no power is entitled to territory in which its inability to preserve order is demonstrated; that where its incapacity is proved by veteran experience, its claim to exercise authority shall be denied. The principle, if enforced, would do more to civilize the world than centuries of educational and evangelical labors. It is but an enlargement of the rule recently added to maritime law, that no blockade shall be recognized by non-belligerents, beyond the limits of its enforcement by an adequate navy. The sovereignty of the Sultan, thus adjudicated, would at once be restricted to so much of his Empire as his revenues and armies would enable him to rule

in peace and order, and the rest would be assigned to contiguous States. And, inasmuch as Mahometanism is exotic in Europe—is inherently foreign to every common feeling and interest of Christendom; and, as its presence only serves as a disturbing element in the European body politic, it is obvious that if the Ottoman Empire were transferred bodily to Asia, with a central seat not far from Jerusalem, the welfare of European and Asiatic Turkey, and of humanity, would be most beneficially consulted. So located, it would possess all the power necessary to preserve order and protect commerce in the now insurgent pachalics of Asia, and the European provinces would either form the seat of a new Lower Empire, or be fairly divided among the great States of Christendom. Such is the inevitable solution of the present difficulty. The sooner it is attained the happier it will be for all parties concerned; and the world is a party.

A GERMAN DIPLOMATIC VICTORY IN THE LEVANT
LONDON TIMES -- NEW YORK TIMES Special Cablegram.
New York Times (1857-Current file); Aug 1, 1902; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times
pg. 5

A GERMAN DIPLOMATIC VICTORY IN THE LEVANT

France Being Ousted from Pro-
tectorate Over Catholics.

The Result of the Rioting Between Or-
thodox Monks and Franciscan
Friars at Jerusalem.

LONDON TIMES--NEW YORK TIMES
Special Cablegram.

LONDON, Aug. 1.—The Vaterland, in an article quoted by the Vienna correspondent of The Times, describes the conflict between Orthodox monks and Franciscan friars at Jerusalem, and incidentally shows that Germany is ousting France from the latter's traditional protectorate over the Catholics in the Ottoman dominions.

Thirty-one Greeks, including twelve monks, were condemned by the Turkish court at Jerusalem to imprisonment for assaulting Franciscan friars. It is alleged that the assault was incited by the Superior of the Orthodox monastery of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

The conviction, says the Vaterland, is a victory for the Catholic cause, as hitherto it had been found impossible to punish Orthodox monks. The French Government abandoned the prosecution at the request of the Russians, and the Franciscans appealed for aid to Germany and Italy.

Justice was secured by the vigorous intervention of Germany, and the Germans, both Protestant and Catholic, are delighted, while the prestige of Germany has been enhanced and that of France has suffered.

New York Times

August 1st, 1902

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**“Palestine is Still a Land of Problems. Moslems and Christians bitterly
opposed to Colonization by Zionist Immigrants”**

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