



Beyond the Realist Model







Realist Model

- National Interests Dominate National Security Policy-Making
 - States have clear unambiguous goals
 - Changes in leaders and institutions are overshadowed by
 - national interests
 - Geopolitical factors
 - Decisions are implemented faithfully

Decision-making in the Realist Model



- Identification of major alternative courses of action (options)
- Accurate estimation of costs/benefits of options
- Resist premature cognitive closure
- Distinguish between possible & probable events
- Tolerate ambiguity
- Assess situation from others' perspective
- Distinguish between relevant & irrelevant information
- Resist premature action
- Adjust to real changes in situation




Other Models

- *Based on experimental studies in psychology & sociology, historical case analysis by historians & political scientists*
- Call into question the assumptions of the realist model
- **Leaders Matter:**
 - Individual Psychology & Crises (Holsti)
 - Individual Motivations & Psychology (Allison & Halperin), (Jervis)
- **Group Dynamics Matters:**
 - Pathologies of Group Psychology (Janis)
- **Institutions Matter:**
 - Organizational Behavior (Allison & Halperin)

Individual Psychology

Crisis & Stress (Holsti)





Crisis


- *situation of unanticipated threat to important values in a **restricted decision timeframe***
 - High threat
 - Short time
 - High uncertainty
- → **Stress**

Crisis Subverts Assumptions of Realist Model




- Curvilinear relationship between stress & performance





Stress & Performance

- Time pressure is not just about clock time
 - complexity & importance of task
- Crisis & stress → acceleration of perception of time passage
 - → truncate search for options
 - → resort to stereotypes of adversary & historical metaphors for current situation
 - → accept consonant information while filtering out dissonant information (**cognitive dissonance**)
 - → interpret ambiguous information as supporting prior view




Stress & Performance


- skews cost/benefit analysis to reinforce preconceived assessments
- Solidify\ies decision-making group
 - Tendency to reduce “in” group size
 - select trusted friends & advisors (share common values, visions, histories, perceptions, & political fates with investment in current policies)
 - see JANIS for effects of this

Individual Psychology

Bureaucratic Politics

(Allison & Halperin)





Bureaucratic Politics Model

- Government agenda-setting & option formulation
 - Driven by *bargaining* among hierarchically positioned players in a policy game)
 - individualistic conceptions of national interests & threats
 - domestic political interests
 - personal interests
 - organizational interests
 - Awareness of existing implementing agents' configuration, resources, operating procedures, etc. constrains decision game




Bureaucratic Politics Model

- Policy decisions follow from
 - Bargaining
 - Compromise



Decision → “Action Games”

- Implementation by subordinate agencies
 - Cascading decisions to lower level decision-makers
 - Σ decisions \neq policy intent




Consequences

- Decisions not a single rational choice
 - Or necessarily the “best” choice
- “Mixed” motive outcome
 - National interests may be subordinate to other interests

Group Think


(Janis)



Pathologies of Small Group Decision-making




- Highly cohesive small group
- Isolation from larger policy making environment
- Lack of tradition of impartial/open leadership



Manifestations

- Illusion of invulnerability, excessive optimism, under-estimate risks
- Unquestioned belief in group's morality, including ethical/moral foundation of decision
- Ability to discount information that might call into question past decisions by the group



Manifestations


- Stereotyping adversary as **evil**, weak, or stupid and therefore not a reliable partner for negotiation & compromise
- Pressure to block deviation or dissent in the group from consensus
- Shared illusion of unanimity




Consequences

- Incomplete survey of objective and alternatives
 - Failure to reexamine previously dismissed alternatives
- Failure to fully analyze risks of preferred choice
- Poor information search
- Selective bias in processing information at hand
- Failure to work out contingency plans

Organizational Politics







Organizational Politics

- Organizations define themselves by their missions
 - Develop a self-image & sense of purpose
- Large complex organizations need SOPs in order to function
 - SOPs help large organization operate, but constrain flexibility & innovation
 - Options are “build into” existing organizational missions, routines – but not all options
- Organizational SOPs & discretion can lead implementation to differ from decision

Misperception

(Jervis)





Hypotheses

- Decision-makers fit incoming information into existing theories & images
 - Decision-makers often fail to realize that information consistent with their theories may be consistent with other views
- Existing theories & images can easily resist piecemeal flows of new information
- Decision-makers often rush to judgment
 - Especially in the face of ambiguous information
- Implementation of decisions may convey a different message to the target than the sender intended



Hypotheses

- Decision-makers tend to see the behavior of others as more centralized, disciplined, coordinated, and controlled than it is.
- Decision-makers tend to believe that their intentions are easily & accurately perceived