



Engineering Risk Benefit Analysis

**1.155, 2.943, 3.577, 6.938, 10.816, 13.621, 16.862, 22.82,
ESD.72, ESD.721**

DA 2. The Value of Perfect Information

George E. Apostolakis

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Recall the evaluation of the survey results

(Slide 14, DA 1):

Strong

$$P(s/L_2) = 0.8$$

$$P(s/L_3) = 0.2$$

$$P(s/L_4) = 0.0$$

Mild

$$P(m/L_2) = 0.2$$

$$P(m/L_3) = 0.6$$

$$P(m/L_4) = 0.3$$

Weak

$$P(w/L_2) = \frac{0.0}{1.0}$$

$$P(w/L_3) = \frac{0.2}{1.0}$$

$$P(w/L_4) = \frac{0.7}{1.0}$$



Perfect Information (Clairvoyant)

- A clairvoyant, CV, is always correct, i.e.,

$$P[\text{CV says } L_2 / L_2 \text{ materializes}] = 1.0 = P[s/L_2]$$

$$P[\text{CV says } L_3 / L_2 \text{ materializes}] = 0.0 = P[m/L_2]$$

$$P[\text{CV says } L_4 / L_2 \text{ materializes}] = 0.0 = P[w/L_2]$$

- Receiving the CV's report removes all uncertainty.



Calculations for “survey result is s” or “survey says L_2 ” (Slide 18, DA 1)

<u>Payoff</u>	<u>Prior Prob.</u>	<u>Likelihood</u>	<u>Product</u>	<u>Posterior Probability</u>
L_2	0.3	$P(s/ L_2)=0.8$	0.24	$P(L_2/s)=0.706$
L_3	0.5	$P(s/ L_3)=0.2$	0.10	$P(L_3/s)=0.294$
L_4	0.2	$P(s/ L_4)=0.0$	0.00	$P(L_4/s)=0.000$
	<u>1.0</u>		<u>0.34</u>	<u>1.000</u>

$P[L_2 \text{ materializes/survey says } L_2] = 0.706$, because the survey is not perfect.



Bayes' Theorem for the Clairvoyant

$$\begin{aligned} & P[L_2 \text{ materializes} / \text{CV says } L_2] = \\ &= \frac{P(\text{CV says } L_2 / L_2 \text{ materializes}) \times P(L_2 \text{ materializes})}{\sum_2^4 P(\text{CV says } L_2 / L_i \text{ materializes}) \times P(L_i \text{ materializes})} = \\ &= \frac{1 \times P(L_2 \text{ materializes})}{1 \times P(L_2 \text{ materializes}) + 0 + 0} = 1 \end{aligned}$$

$P[L_2 \text{ materializes} / \text{CV says } L_2] = 1$ regardless of the prior probability, because the CV is perfect.




The original decision tree

Decisions

States of Nature

Payoffs






Modifications

In a decision tree, the order of the nodes is chronological.

- With perfect information, the uncertainty is resolved before the decision is made (a chance node is followed by a decision node).
- The evaluation is done a priori (before the CV is hired).
- Therefore, the DM believes that the CV will predict L_2 with probability 0.3, L_3 with probability 0.5, and L_4 with probability 0.2.



Decision tree with a clairvoyant





The value of alpha

α : EMV, if the terminal decision is to be made with perfect information at no cost.

$$\alpha = 0.3 \times 300 + 0.5 \times 150 + 0.2 \times 150 = \$195K$$



The value of beta

- What is the EMV without any information?
- We solved this problem in DA 1 (original decision tree).

$$\text{EMV}[\text{no information}] = \$150\text{K} \equiv \beta$$

β : EMV, if the terminal decision is to be made without any opportunity to obtain additional information.

Note: The chance node follows the decision node.




Expected Value of Perfect Information (EVPI)

$$EVPI \equiv \alpha - \beta = \$195 - \$150 = \$45K$$

- **The EVPI is an upper bound on the amount the DM would be willing to pay for additional information.**
- **The expected value of any information source must be between zero and the EVPI. In DA 1, the cost of the survey was $\$20K < EVPI$.**



Decision tree with a clairvoyant





General Tree

- ◆ **If the DM faces uncertainty in a decision (uncertainty nodes after the decision node), the impact of perfect information will be evaluated by *redrawing* the tree and reordering the decision and chance nodes.**

- ◆ **The evaluation of perfect information is done a priori. The DM has not yet consulted the clairvoyant. The DM is considering whether to actually do it.**



Summary and Observations

- **We have developed single-attribute, multi-stage sequential Decision Trees.**
- **The model is useful to a *single* decision maker.**
- **Decision Criterion: Maximize the EMV.**
- **Maximizing the EMV is *not* the best decision criterion.**