

6	9	13	7
12	10	5	
3	1	4	14
15	8	11	2

Mathematics for Computer Science
MIT 6.042J/18.062J

RSA encryption



Albert R Meyer March 13, 2013

RSA.1

6	9	13	7
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Public Key Cryptosystem

Anyone can send a secret (encrypted) message to the receiver, without any prior contact, using publicly available info.



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RSA.<#>

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Public Key Cryptosystem

This sounds paradoxical: how can secrecy be possible using only public info?
Actually has paradoxical consequences.



Albert R Meyer March 13, 2013

RSA.<#>

6	9	13	7
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Mental Chess

Chess masters can play without having a chess board:
"mental chess."
OK, how about "mental poker"?
--I'll deal. ✗
No joke! It's possible.



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RSA.<#>



One-way functions

The paradoxical assumption is that there are **one-way functions** that are **easy to compute** but **hard to invert**.

In particular,

- it is **easy** to compute the **product** n of two (large) primes p and q .
- But given n , it is generally very **hard** to **factor** n to recover p and q



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The RSA Protocol



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RSA Public Key Encryption

Photograph removed due to copyright restrictions.
See here: <http://ams.org/samplings/feature-column/fcarc-internet> (under Public Key Systems)

Shamir Rivest Adleman



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Beforehand

receiver generates primes p, q
 $n ::= p \cdot q$
 selects **e rel. prime** to $(p-1)(q-1)$
 $(e, n) ::=$ **public key**, publishes it
 finds $d ::= e^{-1} \pmod{\phi(n)}$
 d is **private key**, keeps hidden



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RSA

Encoding message $m \in [1, n)$
 send $\hat{m} ::= m^e \pmod{\mathbb{Z}_n}$

Decoding \hat{m} :
 receiver computes
 $m = (\hat{m})^d \pmod{\mathbb{Z}_n}$



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Why does this work?

follows easily from Euler's Theorem when

$$m \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$$


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Why does this work?

actually works for all m ... explained in Class Problem



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Receiver's abilities

- find two large primes p, q
 - ok because: lots of primes
 - fast test for primality
- find e rel. prime to $(p-1)(q-1)$
 - ok: lots of rel. prime nums
 - gcd easy to compute
- find $e^{-1} \pmod{\mathbb{Z}_{(p-1)(q-1)}^*}$
 - easy using Pulverizer



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lots of primes

Prime Number Thm:

$$\pi(n) ::= |\text{primes} \leq n|$$

$$\sim n/\ln n \text{ (deep thm)}$$

Chebyshev's bound:

$$\pi(n) > n/4 \log n$$

"elementary" proof



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RSA.13

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lots of primes

so for 200 digit #'s,
at least 1/1000 is prime

Chebyshev's bound:

$$\pi(n) > n/4 \log n$$

"elementary" proof



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RSA.14

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Fermat Primality Test

check if

$$a^{n-1} = 1 \pmod{n}$$

if fails, not prime (Fermat)

choose random a in $[1, n)$.

if not prime, $\Pr(\text{fails}) > 1/2$
(with rare exceptions)



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RSA.15

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Why is it secure?

- easy to break if can factor n
(find d same way receiver did)
- conversely, from d can factor n
(but factoring appears hard
so finding d must also be hard)
- RSA has withstood 35 years of attacks



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RSA.16

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