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PROFESSOR: Good afternoon.
I decided to go for a little amplification today because
I'm feeling a little underpowered and I think that
if I do my usual unamplified version that sometime around 3
o'clock I'll fall over and somebody will
have to haul me away.
Actually, a lot of the experiments I'm going to talk
about today suggest that you wouldn't do it.
You'd just leave me in a little heap there and slowly
file out and I could try that as like a demo.
But that would be sad.
So I don't think I'll do that, but I will amplify myself in
the effort not to run out of steam here.
When last we met I had setup the Asch experiment-- that's
the 3 line thing, the Milgram experiment where it turned out
that people would shock another apparently innocent
individual to a pretty severe degree without what looked
like an awful lot of provocation.
And then the manufacturers, whatever it was,
consultation-- whatever it says on the handout, that
experiment suggested that under other circumstances
people wouldn't be so willing to comply with a suggestion
that would run against what they would normally do.
And I left it there to say that we'll come back today and
talk about why that must be.
Why that might be the case.
And the context in which I want to talk about that is the
social impact theory.
The source I put on the handout out is--
the guy's got a great name-- his name is Bibb Latane.
It looks like Latane, but you pronounce it Latane and the B
stands for Bibb.
I don't know who names their kid Bibb, but maybe that's how
you grow up to be a famous social psychologist.
So when you're studying for the final you can remind
yourself that social impact is a function of SIN, but that's
just the acronym.
I don't know that Latane every particularly noticed this, but
that's the acronym for his 3 big factors in this theory of
strength, immediacy, and number.
And what I want to do is try to explain those in the
context, particularly at the Milgram experiment.
See how those speak to the question of when it is that
you will give into the social pressures from the outside.
So strength in this case refers to--
well, in the Milgram case really, it would be the
authority of the guy giving you the instructions.
Remember that all the subjects in Milgram's experiment were
upset by the notion that they should be shocking somebody.
And shocking them apparently, severely.
And Milgram had trained himself
to say, please continue.
The experiment must go on.
And not more than that.
He wasn't going to get into an argument with them, he was
just going to say that.
If the guy's saying, please continue.
The experiment must go on is Stanley Milgram,
white-jacketed scientist professor from Yale, you got
63% of people going through all the way to 450 volts in
that experiment.
But if you made a small change in the experiment and the
person running it was just some guy.
You know, Kristen [UNINTELLIGIBLE]
well-intentioned research assistant in the lab or
something like that, compliance dropped to 20%.
I don't know.
I'm sure actually if Kristen was doing it, compliance would
be like 100%.
Because she'd smack them around and stuff like that,
but if it was not an authority figure, if the person giving
you the instruction was a person with less authority
compliance dropped way down.
That is the sort of thing that the military knows, right?
Who gives you the order makes a difference.
Immediacy refers to the vividness of the factors.
Sort of the salience of the factors here.
So I already talked about one immediacy manipulation.
Remember, in the original version of the experiment 100%
of the people went all the way through to 450 volts.
Milgram figured, oh my goodness.
That's because they didn't buy the story at all and he
brought the learner slash victim into sight and into the
range of hearing and that change in the immediacy--
increasing the vividness of the impact you were having on
this other person decreased compliance from 100 to about
2/3 of the population.
If you manipulate the vividness of the pressure on
the subject, compliance can change.
So if Milgram is right there saying, please continue.
The experiment must go on.
You went on.
But if you said, look, I got a rinse a few things out.
I'll be down in my office, if you got any questions about
the experiment call me.
So you know, I have a heart attack.
You know, the learner is busy making all of its bad noises.
The subject is getting antsy.
He picks up the phone.
Please continue.
The experiment must go on.
Yeah, right.
Compliance dropped again to 20%.
So big drop in compliance if the source of the authority
was not right there to help you out.
And if you make the consequences even more vivid,
you can again drop compliance in this experiment.
So in one particularly vivid version of Milgram's
experiment, Milgram didn't have the learner off in
another booth.
He had the learner right next to you making his noises.
And at a critical time in the experiment the electrode is
slipping off the guy's hand and Milgram says, hold the
electrode on him.
And he's still doing the same thing, right?
[UNINTELLIGIBLE]
I'm not going to respond anymore.
I quit.
[UNINTELLIGIBLE]
Compliance drops, you'll be glad to know.
What you may be a little distressed to know is it drops
only to 30%.
30% of the people were still willing to deliver these
punitive shocks all the way through to the end even when
they're holding the guy's hands down on the electrode.
It's this immediacy factor that makes it psychologically
easier to shoot a missile over the horizon and kill somebody
than to actually look somebody in the eye and kill them.
They're dead the same way in either case, you may know
objectively that they're dead.
This is a real issue for the military.
The military knows that it is in the unfortunate business of
killing other people and it also knows that in a way, much
more profound of course than the Milgram experiment that
this is very upsetting to its own soldiers.
To say nothing of the people who get killed, but people
don't like killing other people, typically.
It takes work to get somebody to kill other people and it's
psychologically less damaging if it's over the horizon than
if it's face-to-face.
Though, all you need to do is watch the latest video of some
charming person slitting somebody's throat--
some hostages throat in Iraq-- to realize that it is also
perfectly possible to kill somebody right there.
But there is an immediacy effect, a real
world immediacy effect.
Well, that's perhaps a gruesome one then and you
might think this is only stuff that works in the realm of the
truly horrible.
That's not true either.
Suppose I get curious this evening and I send a note
around saying, what do you think of the Milgram
experiment?
I might get an e-mail back.
I wouldn't bet on it.
Maybe a couple.
I know who would be sending them too by this
point in the term.
If I ask right now, well, what do you think about the Milgram
experiment?
Is that a disturbing experiment?
Few people will nod their heads.
The eastern bloc might raise its hand.
But you know, most of you will successfully sit on your hands
and not do anything.
But you know, if I was to wander over here somewhere--
she's getting very nervous here.
You can see the experiment really works.
And if I was to ask, what do you think of the Milgram
experiment?
I won't actually make her respond, but I could, right?
There's no doubt.
The only person capable of not responding under those
circumstances would be my 15 year-old son, right?
You have perfected this within the realm of your own family,
why did you get that grade?
But under other circumstances the social impact, the social
pressure there is so strong by the time it's all directed at
you that you got to respond.
You can feel that social pressure.
Actually, it was a great experiment.
This was a great experiment because several people thought
I might be headed their way.
And I caught these great fleeting looks of relief from
that side of the aisle when they realized,
he's going that way.
That's immediacy.
That's also actually, an illustration of the effect of
this third factor, which is number.
In the Milgram experiment this was not manipulated.
Milgram experiment is a one-on-one experiment.
There's Milgram or his surrogate exerting pressure on
you, the subject.
In that manufacturers consultants' study or in the
Asch experiment, it is manipulated and you find that
the more people that the authority is trying to spread
his impact over, the less the impact on any given
individual.
Similarly here, if I ask you, 300 of you, what do you think?
Each of you gets--
I don't know if this is actually a linear operation--
but roughly, 1/300 of my impact.
But if I go and find her she gets all the impact and she
has to say something.
Actually, I think, that we could probably work out the
equations here because there's also probably a distance
equation, right?
You know there are people, you out there in the cheap seats
know there are people who sit out in the back because the
possibilities of social impact are less out there.
I can do what I want out there in the cheap seats.
He can't see anything anyway.
Look at all those computers up there, they're all surfing the
web anyway.
But I don't know that anybody's ever looked at the
distance effects in any sort of a direct way.
There's a very nice study done at Ohio State some years ago
during Greek Week.
What the experimenters did was they hung out backstage
because at Greek Week at Ohio State what you had to do was
your fraternity had to get up in front of all these people,
like a big stadium full of people and do something.
Typically, something kind of embarrassing to show how cool
you were and why everybody should join your fraternity.
And what the experimenters noticed was that the number of
guys in the group varied.
You know, you sent out your one guy or you sent out this
troop of 10 guys to do something.
And so what they did was they simply asked people before
they got on stage, how nervous are you?
And the answer was, it was monotonically related to the
number of people.
If it was just you, you felt much more nervous than if
there were 10 guys going out there.
Now there's no real rational basis for that.
You're not going to get hurt out there, but if you imagine
that everybody in that stadium had a tomato you can kind of
understand the social impact version of this.
How many tomatoes are going to hit you if there's just one of
you verses if there's 10 of you.
It's going to diffuse in this case, very
literal sort of impact.
Social impact theory has one of its roots actually in a
lurid and media- circus murder from the 60's.
In fact, a murder that I remember because it happened
in New York City when I was growing up in the New Jersey
suburbs and so it got a lot of coverage.
This was the murder of a woman named Kitty Genovese, who was
murdered in the courtyard of her fairly
large apartment block.
And it wasn't a quick business.
The guy stabbed her and she sort of crawled off into the
bushes and she didn't die and he came back and he finished.
It was gross.
You know, just disgusting murder.
And the reason gross disgusting murders I mean,
there are whole New York radio stations devoted to that.
The reason this was a particularly salient one was
it was clear afterwards that there were at least 40 or so
people who had heard this and nobody had called the police,
let alone intervene directly.
Nobody had called and this generated a whole lot of sort
of media brow beating and stuff about, was it the case
that New Yorkers were just cold, heartless individuals?
Or what?
And rather like the Milgram experiment being motivated by
the question of, were the Nazis special
in some evil sense?
Some of this work on social impact theory was based on the
hypothesis that no, that this didn't illustrate the cruel,
heartless nature of New Yorkers.
What it illustrated was what happens when you're on the
losing end up of what boils down to a social impact
experiment.
The problem was that she was diffusing her impact across
this whole apartment building and when you interviewed
people, people said over and over again, I thought somebody
else would have called.
I wasn't quite sure what was happening.
Somebody else would have had a better look.
They figured that somebody else would have
taken care of it.
The notion is that had this been taking place in the front
yard of your isolated farmstead on the Great Plains
or something like that, you would've done something.
Because you would have known nobody else could have.
Is there any evidence for this?
Well, yes actually.
John Darley, who was one of my professors at Princeton, and
Latane, who worked with him, did a series of beautiful
experiments on this.
Obviously they didn't go around murdering people in
courtyards, but what they did was you'd come into the lab
and lab had a whole bunch of isolation booths in it.
Because except if you're in a weird experiment like that
Asch three line experiment you want to have people doing the
experiment alone.
So a lot of labs are setup this way and so, you, the
subject, would go into this little booth to do the
experiment.
And then something would happen.
For instance, you'd hear crash and help.
And the question was, who cares what you're
doing in the booth?
The only interesting question in this experiment is, how
fast do you come out of the booth to help?
The answer is it depends on how many other booths you
think are occupied.
And of course, Darley and Latane made very sure that you
knew exactly how many booths were occupied.
So if it was the case that you knew that you were all alone
you were out there fast because the impact was on you.
If there was going to be any help around it
was going to be you.
If the booth was full--
if you knew that there were six other people in the
experiment you were slower to come out because well, I'm not
the biggest, strongest guy.
Somebody else will help and I didn't take that Red Cross
course or whatever.
The responsibility gets diffused
across multiple people.
It's not just for helping.
In another one of their entertaining versions, smoke
comes into the lab.
How fast do you get out of there?
If you're alone, you're moving.
If you're not alone, you're thinking, he's not moving.
He must know something I don't know.
And if he's not moving it's going to be
embarrassing, right?
If I go, fire!
Fire!
And I go running around.
Everybody's going to think I'm a complete doofus.
Now the downside, this is a beautiful experiment showing
beautiful social impact effect-- the downside of this
was this was done at Princeton where I eventually showed up
as an undergraduate to do my nice boring research on visual
perception.
None of my subjects ever believed that I was doing a
visual perception experiment.
It didn't help that the room I had was one of these rooms
with a half silvered mirror in it.
So that I could look in and they couldn't look out.
I didn't care I was planning to look in, it was left over
from the social psych guys.
But nobody ever believed I was there to do a regular just
straight up and down--
I just want to know what color it looks like experiment.
They all figured, you're watching me, right?
Something weird's going to happen here.
Oh, along those lines, didn't happen to me, but a word to
the wise should you ever find yourself in an experiment in
one of these rooms that looks like one wall is mirrored.
If you're in a psych lab it's probably a
half silvered mirror.
The implication of a half silvered mirror is that that's
not a mirror that you want to use to readjust large parts of
your anatomy.
It was a great story.
The poor grad student was embarrassed for life.
He was a very, kind of straight up and down squarish
kind of guy and anyway, it was very embarrassing.
The grad student was the observer here and it was
embarrassing.
So don't do that.
You don't want to embarrass people.
Oh, one last example, closer to a real world example of
this, the great I think, it's another Darley and Latane,
liquor store experiment.
You go into a liquor store.
You're hanging out in the liquor store.
These two guys come in, they ask the guy in the liquor
store, do you have any [UNINTELLIGIBLE]
weird beer, some weird beer.
The liquor store guy says, I don't have it up here.
I might have some in the basement and he takes off for
the basement.
As soon as he's gone the two guys look at the case of Bud,
say, haha, he'll never miss this.
Pick up the case of Bud and leave.
The guy comes up from the basement and asks, where are
those guys?
And the question is, everybody's a stooge in this
experiment of course except you.
The question is, what do you say?
The answer is, if you are all alone 2/3 of
you say, the guys--
they like stole the beer.
But if you're with even one other person
that drops to 1/3.
Again, because of this diffusion of responsibility,
you say to yourself, unconsciously,
implicitly, or whatever--
if he's not saying anything, why should I say something?
And so you're less likely to say something.
Now the one good side of this, this is all sort of
depressing, right?
It sort of suggests that if we're going to hang out in
large social groups, one of the downsides of this is that
we're not going to look after each other terribly well.
There's a useful inoculation effect here and I've just
inoculated you.
The fact that you know about this, there are experiments
suggesting that the fact that you know about this makes you
more likely, the next time the occasion arrives to discount
the number of other people there.
So now it is probably the case that if I do keel over
somebody will rescue me, even though the responsibility for
this has been diffused across.
Of course, the reason is because somebody's going to
think it's a fake.
And they think, I'm going to win the prize if I collect him
or something.
But I'll try not to do the experiment at all.
But in any case, there is evidence that once you know
about these things you're less vulnerable to those effects
and less likely to find yourself complying with an
instruction that's wrong.
I mean, look, you probably have a good intuitive feeling
and I hope you're right that all over Iraq now, if you're
holding prisoners you've now been inoculated against doing
a whole round of stupid things.
When the Abu Ghraib broke every social psychologist in
the country was on some talking heads show on national
public radio saying, we knew about this.
We can explain this because that's exactly the sort of
thing that's understandable in the context of these sorts of
experiments.
People doing things that they would never-- you know, what's
the chance that you were back home before going off to Iraq
saying, I'm going to go to Iraq.
I'm going to get me some prisoners, put them in
compromising sexual positions and get photos sent back home.
No, nobody thinks about doing that, but the social situation
that you find yourself in with perhaps an implicit command
from somebody that loosens things up a bit
produced the effect.
The fact that this was a disaster has presumably now
inoculated the system at least in the short-term against it
happening again, at least we may hope so.
The practical sort of questions, like what do you do
about prisoner abuse are one interesting line that grows
from this sort of work.
Another question, returning perhaps to this sort of more
basic, psychological side of things is what I think I
labeled on that handout as-- oh yes,
the fundamental question.
I decided if you could have the fundamental attribution
error that I would invent for today's purposes, the
fundamental question.
But understand that that's my invented jargon and I won't
put a question on the exam saying, what's
the fundamental question?
The question here is, who is this--
I keep talking about you-- you know, you can be pushed around
by these laws of social impact and stuff like that.
Who is this you, or I that can be so readily manipulated?
There's a lot of folk psychology about it.
Well, look, we understand for instance, it is possible to
control a car in such a way that the car kills somebody.
It is also possible to train a dog in such a way that the dog
kills somebody, and history tells us, it is possible to
train human beings in such a way that a human being kills
another human being.
There's something fundamentally different, folk
psychology understands that there's something
fundamentally different about the responsibility involved
here on the part of the car, the dog, and the human.
And that seems to have to do with this sense of self.
The sense of you as a self-aware, psychologically
continuous overtime kind of entity.
Is there anything useful that we can say about that?
About that sense of you as a psychological self?
All right, let's back into this a little bit.
If you look at me, you know who I am, right?
Pretty much, those of you who don't, it's getting a little
late in the term.
But you know, you recognize me.
That's fine.
Could I be a cunningly disguised actor who's
impersonating Wolfe today?
Yeah, that's possible.
Be mildly interesting.
OK fine.
Switch.
All right, let's suppose this is your mother or somebody
else who you feel strongly about.
You look at that person and the recognition has
two pieces to it.
More than presumably looking at just some person you know.
There's a fairly strong affective component.
Let's take the best case scenario here.
You see your mother you recognize, that's my mother
and I love my mother.
OK, good.
Let's suppose that something goes wrong with the affect
piece of that.
You know, there's some hunk of brain that's
doing that for you.
Something goes wrong with that little hunk of brain and you
look at your mother and you say, I recognize my mother and
I hate that.
Or I don't feel anything would be another possibility.
That doesn't make sense.
This again, happening--
you're not sitting there with a little checklist saying,
does this makes sense?
You're toting up your current experience and asking
implicitly, does this make sense?
The answer is no.
How could that be?
Well, one possibility--
it sounds a little odd-- but one possibility is that's not
really my mother.
It looks like my mother, but actually she's been cunningly
replaced by a fake.
Why would that be?
Well, you know, if it was my real mother, I love my mother.
I don't love this, therefore it's a fake.
Now that sounds weird, but it's a real
neurological condition.
It's called Capgras syndrome.
I put a definition of it, I think, on the handout.
I always think of it as crab grass syndrome, but the
Capgras is correct and it's the name of somebody.
The disorder seems to be an effort to reconcile an
unreconcilable pair of thoughts.
It sometimes travels with schizophrenia as a diagnosis.
It may be the result of a brain injury.
Typically, when there's a brain injury involved it looks
like it's frontal lobe in some fashion.
It's relevant to the current discussion because you can
have the same phenomenon for yourself.
You look in the mirror, you say, that's not me.
And you have a denial that you are you.
It points out that even something as
self- evident as--
is it a Dr. Seuss book--
I am I, where's that from?
I can almost hear it.
You haven't been reading your kid lit recently enough.
AUDIENCE: Sam I Am.
PROFESSOR: No, Sam I Am, but I don't think
Sam has Capgras issues.
I am I, and I can't remember what comes next.
Oh well, doesn't matter.
In any case, one might ask whether there is some little
piece of neural tissue that is you in this sense.
That if we were to go in and take out this one little bit
of tissue that what we would discover is that you weren't
you anymore.
That you'd be-- yeah, you'd still have a memory, you'd
still have this, you'd still have that, but you just
wouldn't have this sense of being you.
The short answer to that is there doesn't seem to be any
specific lesion that does that.
That used to be sort of the end of
this part of the lecture.
However, particularly with the advent of fMRI it's becoming
increasingly clear that aspects of this sense of the
self do have homes in the brain that can be localized to
some extent, damaged in various odd neurological
disorders, and give us some idea about how it is that this
sense of self is assembled.
So what I've done is I've actually modified a list from
a recent article in Trends in Cognitive Science to come up
with six aspects of the self.
To give you some notion about how you could take this
problem apart the first of these--
I must have just listed them on the handout, right?
The first of these is representation.
Nobody, when asked about themselves, what kind of
person are you?
Nobody says, Oh, I am just a collection of reflexes
responding to the current situation in the environment.
Everybody has a list of you know, I'm an honest, loving
individual.
You may have some sort of trait or situational theory
about how you came to be honest and loving and all
that, but you've got a set of traits that you believe to be
fundamental to you, at least at the present time.
And that's your representation of yourself.
That's your theory of you.
You also, as part of that theory you have
this notion of agency.
That you are responsible and in fact, you are the cause of
at least a reasonable number of your actions.
You feel that you own those actions.
That's part of what makes the Milgram experiment disturbing.
It's not disturbing that a machine can produce 450 volt
shocks of some schnook.
It's disturbing that you can because you figured that you
own that action and that if you did it that says
something about you.
That's this question of agency.
Now not only do you own actions, you own your body.
That's the aspect of ownership that I'm talking about in
number 3 there.
You own your body.
Look, you also own your laptop.
But you own your body in ways that are more profound than
the way that you own your laptop.
There's something fundamentally
different about that.
You're able to use this information that you've got
about what kind of you you are.
You're able to use that to perform new
calculations, if you like.
Like, do I like--
I don't know--
I need a new fruit.
Durian.
Do I like durian?
Well, it's a fruit.
I like fruits.
It's supposed to smell like fermented garlic.
Sounds [UNINTELLIGIBLE].
I can ask myself questions about my self based on my
knowledge of myself.
That's this evaluation aspect.
Monitoring is sort of a sub--
well, I don't know if I would consider it to
be a subset of that.
Monitoring is keeping track of what you are doing and asking
yourself how it's going.
All right, so I'm self- monitoring here saying, am I
really going to fall over today?
No, I don't think so.
I'm feeling pretty good just at the moment.
That's monitoring.
You're asking yourself, am I still awake?
If you're answering yes, the answer is probably yes.
If you answer no, that's a little weird.
Or it's lucid dreaming or something.
That's nice, too.
And finally there's this sense of integration where the whole
thing is tied together into a single self.
There's been plenty of evidence that we've been
accumulating during the course of the term that you are in
some sense a committee.
That you've got lots of semi-autonomous bits and
pieces doing their thing and giving rise to you, but an
important sense of you is that it doesn't
feel that way to you.
You don't think of yourself as a committee or a collective or
what's that thing-- is Star Wars where
the colonial organism--
is that the Borg?
The Borg, right?
You don't think you're the Borg.
You've got this sense that you are a unitary thing.
Now each of these bits, while it's not the case that we can
go in and somehow pull out the thing that is you, at least
nobody's figured out what piece of brain that might be.
Each of these aspects of you is subject to attack and to
some degree at this point of localization in the brain.
A clear example would be the question of ownership.
I think I actually talked about some of this earlier
when we were talking about perception.
If you get a lesion in your right parietal lobe you will
typically show symptoms of what's known as
contralateral neglect.
Contralateral meaning on the other side and what I think I
talked about when I was talking about perception is
the fact that you will ignore the left side of visual space
and I think at that point I also mentioned that people
ignore the left side of their body.
You can have all sorts of varieties of neglect, but it
can include ignoring the left side of your body to the point
of denying--
I mean, you can see it, but you might deny that it's you.
That's neglect.
Interestingly, if you lesion the left parietal lobe you do
not typically get neglect of the right side of the body.
At least not in right-handed individuals.
The best understanding I've ever come up with for that is
that it may be that in right-handed individuals the
right side of the body is represented more robustly or
redundantly than the left side of the body and so a typical
lesion that leaves you alive, at least, doesn't take out the
entire sense that you own that side of the body.
Whereas, a lesion of the less dominant, right hemisphere,
left side of the body takes out this sense-- leaves you
with the sense that you don't own the left side of
your body at all.
Now the flip side of this is our phantom limb phenomena.
So suppose you lose the limb rather than the piece of brain
that represents the limb.
So if you lose a limb very typically--
well, the hunk of brain is still there.
And the brain is a kind of a noisy place.
What's going to happen if you've got activity that goes
above some sort of threshold in the chunk of brain that
used to represent this arm?
The answer is, you're going to think you've still got an arm.
And you may know at some nice cognitive or depressing
cognitive level that you don't have that arm anymore, but
it's going to feel like it's there.
And it can be really annoying.
Because phantom limbs do things like they get stuck in
a position.
Why's that annoying?
Well, that's annoying because somebody with a phantom limb
stuck like this walking out the door
does things like this.
Which is exactly what you would do of course if your arm
was like in a sling out there because you don't want to bash
into the door.
But you know, you feel a bit of a fool if you're doing that
with a limb that you know perfectly well isn't there.
What do you do if you've got an itch in your phantom limb?
Or actually pain in phantom limbs is an even
more serious problem.
Perfectly possible to have pain in your phantom limb.
It's not particularly easy to treat that.
Now it turns that the brain, the brain, like
nature, abhors a vacuum.
And if you lose a limb the chunks of the brain
surrounding the arm representation start to say,
there's open territory here.
We could take that.
And over time the brain reorganizes and you get very
curious reports about the limb changing.
So the limb may shrivel up.
There are reports where the guy comes back to the doctor
and says, how you doing?
I'm doing much better.
Now instead of this stupid limb out here I just have
fingers hanging off my shoulder.
Which it's kind of weird, but since they're invisible it's
not that weird.
What seems to happen is that neighboring stuff takes over
what's near to the arm and the hand in the sensory
homunculus, for example, are things like the face.
And I put a reference to Ramachandran's entertaining,
as I said, a book on the handout.
Blakesley is a science writer, Ramachandran or Rama as he is
usually called is--
well, I think of him as a vision researcher though,
mostly these days he's gone off more into the sort of
neurological work.
But what he did was he was testing phantom limb patients.
He would touch them on their face and
ask, what do you feel?
And the patient-- he's got interesting video actually of
the patient saying, well, look of course, I can feel you
touching my face, but the interesting thing is it also
feels like you're touching my phantom thumb.
You move over a little bit and now it feels like you're
touching this phantom finger and so on.
And you could actually map out for hand and arm across the
surface of this guy's face.
He loved it, by the way.
Why did he think this was good?
Yeah?
AUDIENCE: He could itch it?
PROFESSOR: Yeah, he knew where to scratch if it itched.
And it worked.
You get an itch on your phantom arm, he's now learned
that he can scratch there and you get a degree of relief.
So the sense of ownership of the body can be localized in
the brain to the things like these parietal structures.
The degree to which the brain is plastic even in adulthood
is a growing story where you find that the chunks of--
oh there was an fMRI study showing for instance, that if
you look at violinists, the representation of the
fingering hand in the brain is larger than the representation
of the bowing hand.
The fingering hand is learning a whole lot of stuff that the
bowing hand doesn't need to and it ends up using more
brain, apparently.
All right, lets go back to this notion of the self as a
bundle of personality attributes.
And of your understanding of the
implications of that knowledge.
So these are the ideas of representation and evaluation
from that earlier list.
Does this have a home?
Maybe is a reasonable answer.
There is evidence from neuropathology that suggests
disorders that specifically attack that
aspect of the self.
The disorder I'm thinking of is known as Pick's disease,
which I probably labeled on the handout as a
fronto-temporal dementia.
Oh, it says that on the handout also.
The way to think about it is sort of like an Alzheimer's of
the personality.
It's an Alzheimer's like disorder, it's a terrible
diagnosis by the way because it typically is a very
progressive--
quite rapidly progressive dementia that leaves you
witless fairly quickly and dead fairly shortly
thereafter.
Very bad news.
But it is of psychological interest because while the
initial manifestations of Alzheimer's are often this
sort of forgetfulness, the manifestations--
what gets your family to bring you to the doctor if you've
got Pick's is a change in personality.
I'll tell you a couple of anecdotes here.
Here's a patient, 54 year-old woman described as a charming,
dynamic real estate agent who goes from wearing expensive
designer apparel to choosing cheap clothing and gaudy beads
and asking strangers how much their clothes cost.
Once a lover of French cuisine, she adopted a love of
fast food, particularly, Taco Bell.
Now look, if you like Taco Bell that doesn't mean you're
going to die of dementia next week.
The point is that what people notice, what your family
typically notices is an unexplained change in that
sort of list of attributes that makes you you.
Or a patient, 63 year-old woman
described as a well- dressed--
I don't know why they're all well- dressed-- well- dressed,
lifelong political conservative who became an
animal rights activist who hated conservatives, dressed
in T-shirts and baggy pants and liked to say Republicans
should be taken off the earth.
So again, you can imagine somebody whose political
opinions evolve, but you could also imagine that if your
rock- ribbed Republican grandma was suddenly doing a
kind of a late hippie thing and people might worry.
The lesions here seem to be typically at this stage in the
right frontal lobe when you get these
people into a scanner.
That was a mistake.
Shouldn't try lecturing while you're drinking.
But no, you don't have to rescue me.
I think I'll be able to rescue myself.
Anyway, so the loci that seem to be particularly important,
but if I've been eating you should come up and then
Heimlich me and stuff like that.
I don't think the Heimlich maneuver works well for water.
Anyway, the particular chunks of brain that seem, at least
one recent study suggests are important here, are chunks of
the frontal lobe lying on the midline, so your
brain's like this.
If you open it up that's the medial surface of the cerebral
hemispheres.
And there's evidence that locations sort of in there are
what's important.
What may be very important for putting together this
sense of the self.
I think I did-- oh yes, I put on the handout the notion that
orbital medial prefrontal cortex might be a possible
home for representation.
I put that there just because it's got to be so much fun to
go off and be able to talk about the OMPFC and to
distinguish it from the DMPFC.
I promise not to ask exactly that--
is representation localized in the OMPFC or DMPFC?
This is for the subset of you who are dying to go off to med
school and stuff like that and want practice using jargon
that nobody else will understand.
Don't get me wrong, this is useful stuff.
If you're interested in the topic the reference on the
handout to-- did I put the reference on the handout?
Yes, this comes from this Northoff and Bermpohl article
way up at the top of page 2.
By all means, go check it out.
I just realized when I was thinking about lecturing about
this that I knew that a whole bunch of people are going to
go get deeply obsessive about worrying about whether they've
got the OM versus the DM straight and I don't want
people to spend a lot of time worrying about that.
What I want you to come away with is the notion that there
are a set of localizable bits of particularly frontal
structures in the brain where you can make a case for each
little bit being responsible for a little bit of this
overall sense of the self.
Well, one of the ones actually where the little chunk of
brain-- again, I probably won't ask a question, but
where little chunk of brain is quite clearly doing something
specific for you is the anterior cingulate.
Again, and the midline of the brain or the medial surface of
the cerebral hemispheres are wrapped around the corpus
callosum, that big bundle of fibers that connects the two
halves of the brain.
The cool thing about that is that it really looks like it's
serving a monitoring role.
What it does is it's the thing that's siting there checking,
am I making a mistake here?
If you're in our lab I can feel my anterior cingulate
light up because if you're in the lab and you're doing a
whole bunch of visual search experiments and you hit the no
key just as you see the target--
that "Oh dear" phenomenon.
Where you can just feel yourself saying a word you
shouldn't say, that's your anterior cingulate error
monitoring.
How do we know that?
Because if you do these experiments in a scanner when
people make errors that lights up.
It's really quite lovely.
It's also, in the practical advice side of the course, it
turns out at least from a couple of things that I read
that the anterior cingulate is particularly
vulnerable to alcohol.
What's that mean?
Well, it means have a few drinks and the chunk of your
brain that's saying, "Is this a mistake?" takes a vacation.
So have a few drinks, go down to Kenmore Square to celebrate
the Red Sox--
look, there's a car.
Could we flip that over?
Yeah, we could do that.
Would that be a mistake?
I don't know, the guys asleep so don't wake him up.
Or you know, go and drink a few things and should I sleep
with that person?
I don't know, we'll ask in the morning.
Well, I guess the answer was no, I shouldn't have.
But anyways, next time you are inclined to imbibe something
stronger than Poland Spring Water just think of your
little anterior cingulate that's bathing in alcohol and
then you can go drive down the highway and say, "Would it be
a mistake to pass this semi on a wet road tonight?
Well, I don't know, let's find out." So you want to keep that
piece of your brain and you want to keep it more or less
functional.
The conscious you, this notion of integration seems to have
something to do with the notion.
What's it mean that it's all one thing?
In some way this is all tied into the fact that you feel
like a single,
self-reflective, conscious entity.
Well, one interesting question is, are you conscious?
Well, sure.
Now that I asked you.
Were you conscious before I asked you?
Oh maybe.
This is what's known in the philosophical literature as
the refrigerator light problem.
Is the refrigerator light on when the
refrigerator is closed?
AUDIENCE: No.
PROFESSOR: Well you know that the answer is really no and
look-- even most philosophers know that.
But that's because you have some sort of a deeper
understanding of refrigerators.
But if you're just faced with this thing and the question
is, is the light on when the door is closed?
How would you know?
Open the door, light's on.
It's always on.
Every time I open it up the light is on, it's cool.
People seriously entertain the possibility that consciousness
is like that.
It feels continuous because every time you ask yourself in
any fashion about whether or not you're conscious, not
counting the guys who were out cold and well, they can't ask
themselves anyway, you feel conscious, right?
The closest you can get to a sort of a feeling that there
might be an issue here is there's a phenomenon known to
long haul drivers where you're driving down the interstate,
you get from point A to point B and you have no recollection
of having done that.
The good thing is if you're doing that
while you're asleep.
Asleep is a different problem.
It's a very serious problem, but the greatest number of car
accidents per mile is not like in downtown Boston where you
would think it ought to be.
But it's like way out West because 600 miles, the road
doesn't even turn.
The problem is the 601 mile it makes a 10 degrees slant off
to one side and you're semi doesn't.
And you're straight into the sage brush or something like
that because you've gone to sleep.
But the less dire version of this is you can get into a
sort of a "nnnnn" kind of state driving down the
interstate where you really seem to lose a chunk of time
and you ask yourself, was I conscious during that?
I must have been awake because I didn't crash the car, but
there's nothing there.
Whether or not you were conscious or not I can't speak
to because of this refrigerator light problem.
If we asked you while you were in the midst of the state, are
you conscious?
You'd say, "Of course I'm conscious.
That's a stupid question."
If you're interested, one of the projects--
one of the more interesting neuroscience projects out
there is to decide which bits of brain are important for
consciousness.
Christof Koch at Caltech has done a lot of work on this,
wrote an interesting new book, which I would've put on the
handout if I could have quickly found the reference,
but if you go to my website you can find my one page
review of the book-- which tells you what the books about
without you actually having to read it, but it would also
give you the reference to the book.
But Christof refers to the neural correlate of
consciousness.
The question is, which bits of brain do
you need to be conscious?
And then you can go on from there to ask, what that
consciousness might actually be for?
It's very clear that we can do an awful lot of stuff without
being conscious.
This is an important wrinkle on this issue of agency.
There's an interesting body of research that suggests that
when you feel like you are making a decision--
which one of these things do you want-- the brain, we can
pick up a lecture of physiological indications that
you have made the decision before you, the owner of the
brain, know that you've made the decision.
One can wrap oneself in philosophical knots trying to
ask yourself what that means about the agency of
your acts, are you--
the conscious you-- committing those acts or are you merely
reporting on them afterwards?
But there is this interesting data that suggests that you
have made the decision before you know that
you've made the decision.
In any case, what we can't find is clear evidence of a
single, little piece of neural tissue that is you.
No single lesion seems to leave everything else intact,
but take you out.
So what I want to do now is to switch from neuropathology to
psychopathology.
But I will do that after you take a brief stretch here and
then we'll talk about that a bit.
[INTERPOSING VOICES]
AUDIENCE: I had a question about the syndrome that you
talked about where you can't recognize who you are.
Is it visual?
Like so if you look in the mirror--
PROFESSOR: Oh, no.
You know perfectly well looking in the mirror that
that looks exactly like me.
The weird thing is it just isn't me.
If I had a photograph of you, you would know that was you
and you would also know that it wasn't you.
I mean, it's not you, you're this person right here.
Now if I had a photograph of your mother you would know
that this was a representation of your mother, but wasn't
necessarily your mother, per se.
The weird thing about Capgras is if I had your mother here
you would have the same sort of sense of it being it looks
like mother, but it just isn't.
It's one of those things where it'd be cool if you could have
this reversibly just to know what it felt like.
It'd be very hard to wrap you brain around what that
particular delusion must feel like.
There are visual disorders where you don't recognize
faces, that's prosopagnosia.
I think I talked about earlier.
Where I look at you, I say, two eyes, nose,
mouth, it's a face.
Whose is it?
I don't know.
This is in some sense the opposite, a
complement of that.
I know exactly who it is, I just don't
believe it in some sense.
AUDIENCE: Well I mean, if I have that disorder and
[UNINTELLIGIBLE PHRASE].
PROFESSOR: Your hand.
That's interesting.
I'm not sure I've ever read anything about whether people
deny their own-- in neglect you would deny it was your own
hand, but in neglect typically the hand would be paralyzed.
You wouldn't be doing anything with it because of the nature
of the stroke.
I don't know.
I thought you were going to ask whether I could look at
that water bottle and deny it was my water bottle and it
doesn't seem to extend to objects.
It seems to be a very person specific kind of delusion.
That it's about people and about people with whom you
have strong affective relations.
Very sad kind of thing because you read these anecdotes about
how would you feel because typically somebody is in tough
shape for one reason or another when
they've got this disorder.
So you're visiting your kid in hospital said he's busy
declaring you're an evil agent who's disguised as Daddy.
You know, that must be heartbreaking.
And I remember reading one account where Daddy, in an
effort to cure the kid, comes back and declares.
I did it, I killed him.
And I think the story was it provided some temporary relief
and then it didn't stick.
But very weird stuff and very, small, it's rare stuff; small
literature.
I just realized I suppose it didn't matter, but I just
realized that if I'm going to mike myself having discussions
during the break could be a little risky.
I got to make sure that I'm just talking about the details
of Capgras syndrome, which we were as opposed to having a
discussion about--
I hate my TA.
Oh yeah, what's the name of your TA?
That wouldn't work.
Or I love my TA, and nevermind.
Let's get onto psychopathology--
my own and others.
The first thing to do is to say something about the
distinction between a neuropathology and a
psychopathology, which might seem a little weird in a
course that began by asserting the mind is
what the brain does.
I mean, in what sense can you talk about neuropathology on
one side and a psychopathology on the other?
I decided today and I'll see if I still think tomorrow that
it's a useful distinction to think of it sort of like a
hardware bugs versus software bugs.
Same computer not working in some interesting fashion or
other, but you can have a problem because some piece of
the equipment is broken.
And you can have a problem because the program running
over that equipment is not working properly.
Now I realize as I'm saying that that there is one problem
with that analogy, which is that if I have a hardware bug
I'm going to be inclined to fix the hardware and if I have
a software bug I'm going to be inclined to fix the software.
That distinction is by no means as clear in
psychopathology versus neuropathology.
So you can have a brain lesion where the treatment is
essentially behavioral because you want to do some sort of
retraining of the brain that you've got left and you can
have a psychopathology, a problem if you like with the
way that the software is running where the intervention
is to give somebody a drug that's doing its work
essentially on the hardware.
So the metaphor is not perfect,
but it gets at something.
Psychopathologies are...
it's worth thinking of as problems with the way that the
program is using the brain.
Are there psychopathologies that
specifically attack the self?
The answer is yes.
Those are what's known in the trade as
dissociative disorders.
Much beloved of various and sundry literary outlets, so
the cleanest one if you like is psychogenic amnesia or
depersonalization.
Occasionally resorted to by soap opera writers who have
backed themselves into a corner.
That's the get a knock on the head and I don't know who I
am, I don't know where I am.
And that allows you to do a certain amount of plot
twiddling as needed.
Oh, let me say a word about--
now that we're talking about psychopathology--
I need to say something about psychiatric hypochondria,
which is psychogenic amnesia.
Very rare, it's not going to happen to you.
It's not even going to happen to you after I tell you we
don't really know what the cause is, but the best we know
about it is that it's a response to severe stress.
The problem is, you say that and people say "huhh!".
I'm under more stress than I've ever been all my life.
I'm going to wake up tomorrow and not going
to know who I am.
Not going to happen, very rare stuff.
But this is a close kin, this is the intro psych kin, to med
student hypochondria which is a very real known phenomenon.
Med students are always coming down with spectacularly rare
diseases, at least in their own minds.
You hear about some new set of symptoms of some weird
tropical disorder and you can kind of-- is that like a tape
worm right about there?
They worry about these things a lot.
And in the same way that they probably don't have that tape
worm because you just don't pick them up at
Harvard Med, mostly.
You shouldn't worry about whether tomorrow you're going
to wake up without knowing who you are.
Even though you may be under a certain degree of stress.
That said, so let me tell you one case.
A woman wakes up--
a woman is found, actually in a bad state under the bushes
in Florida somewhere back in 1980.
Doesn't know who she is.
Can't remember anything about her past.
And eventually, in an effort to figure out who she is and
they call her Jane Doe of course, and then take her on
morning TV and ask basically, does anybody know who I am?
And immediately got a string of phone calls that suggested
that they knew exactly who she was.
She had apparently left Ohio a few years earlier and moved to
Florida and then disappeared.
Her parents hadn't heard from her for several years.
And unclear what happened in this particular case,
atypically she did not recover her memory.
Typically, these global amnesias are transient.
In her case, at least at the time of the report I was
reading, she had not recovered her memory.
That's the most global, if you like, of these
dissociative disorders.
Fugue states, from the Latin word "to fly" are related.
Again, it's presumed to be a response to severe stress.
There's a very nice case described by William James in
his great Principles of Psychology-- the best intro
text ever written in 1890, so we can't still use it.
But he talks about the Reverend Ansel Bourne who took
some money out of the bank in Providence,
Rhode Island and vanished.
He reappeared-- well, he woke up one morning in, I think,
Norristown, Pennsylvania and discovered that for the past
two months he had been running a store in the
name of A.J. Brown.
He had no recollection of the preceding two months.
Hypnosis turns out to be a useful, if somewhat mysterious
tool in such cases.
And James, who was very interested in hypnosis found
that under hypnosis he could sort of call up
either Brown or Bourne.
They didn't seem to know each other, but what seems to have
happened was--
that the characteristic of a fugue state is that you
disappear to another location and pick up another identity.
Now one of the interesting things about this and it's
actually a theme that will recur through a lot of
discussions of psychopathology.
Is that a fugue state is in a sense an abnormal version of
something that we all understand as a normal story.
In fact, most of us in our family histories somewhere
have somebody back in Germany or Poland or China or Russia
or Korea or somewhere who was under a lot of stress in the
Old Country, picked up, and developed a whole new identity
in the U.S. The major difference of course, is that
grandpa remembered the old country.
Grandpa hadn't suddenly just gone poof and hey, now I'm
running a store in Brooklyn.
Nothing like that.
But the notion that a response to an intolerable situation
here might be to move here is sort of like
the American story.
The pathological aspect is if you don't remember what had
happened before.
Now by the time you've got a couple of different
characters, particularly, who can be called in and out of
awareness under hypnosis, you are very close to everybody's
favorite dissociative disorder, long known as
multiple personality disorder.
Now more officially known as dissociative identity
disorder, but I will continue to refer to it as multiple
personality disorder because if I think multiple
personality disorder I know what I mean immediately.
If I say dissociative identity disorder I have
to think about it.
They are essentially the same thing.
This is the situation in which two or more personalities
appear to occupy the same individual.
Popular with popular supermarket psych books.
The great movie of my youth was a movie called
Three Faces of Eve.
Has anybody ever seen it?
Oh good, must still be playing in reruns on some old--
scared the wits out of me when I was little.
Can't remember anything about it except that I mean, she
didn't have really three faces, she did have three
personalities.
Let me tell you instead about Billy
Milligan, a convicted rapist.
Not a nice person.
But one who attempted to get off his conviction by claiming
a lack of responsibility due to a
multiple personality disorder.
Depending on which of the multiple accounts you read of
this he had anywhere between 10 and 24 personalities
including Arthur, a sort of master personality who knew
all the others rattling around inside him.
Arthur is reputed to know Arabic and to be self- taught
in physics and chemistry.
Regen was aggressive, fluent in Serbo-Croatian, spoke with
a thick accent and was reported to be the initiator
of the sexual assaults.
Adalana is a shy, introverted lesbian with a spontaneous
nystagmus, reported to be the actual rapist.
Now there's a whole collection of weird stuff there.
One point is that there's no guarantee that all the
personalities are the same gender.
A perhaps more salient point here is this spontaneous
nystagmus thing.
And nystagmus is a beating movement of the eyes.
It's hard to fake.
There's an argument about whether multiple personality
disorder is for real.
And even if it is for real there's always an argument in
a court case for whether or not somebody's just trying to
get off the hook by faking it.
This spontaneous nystagmus is important because
it's hard to fake.
If you sit there and try to vibrate your eyes continuously
that's not easy.
So as Allen he's a con man, Tommy knows electronics and
plays the sax, Samuel is an Orthodox Jew and a woodcarver
and so on and so on and so on.
So it's very odd business.
On the face of it it's a fragmentation of the self.
If you think of the self as a kingdom this is like a bunch
of the provinces have rebelled and they have complicated
diplomatic relationships with each other.
Who knows who?
Who's talking to who?
Who likes who?
Very complicated construct here.
Oh, one important way to distinguish a psychopathology,
which if it's for real-- it clearly is-- from a
neuropathology is nobody would expect to put this guy in a
scanner and call up--
I don't know--
Regen, the Serbo-Croatian rapist and find, there he is.
That piece of brain and now the other guy's over here and
this guy's over here.
Look, they're all making use of the same brain.
They're all forming memories, for instance, and using
presumably the same hippocampus to do it.
This is a case of very odd software
running over the hardware.
So it's a troubling pathology.
Yep, there's a question?
AUDIENCE: What's the deal with the eye beating and why is
that hard to fake?
PROFESSOR: Why is it hard to fake?
Well, just sit yourself in front-- well, you can't look
at your own eyes moving in the mirror, so you
can't try it that way.
Pick a friend, look at a friend, try to keep your eyes
beating rhythmically for five minutes by an act of will.
Make sure you have aspirin handy.
It's just very hard to do.
I can do all sorts of really weird things with my eyes
actually, but that's not a nystagmus.
That's some sort of weird, spastic movement.
Even if you could produce a movement any competent
opthamologist can look at a nystagmus or you can record it
and know whether this is a plausible neurological sign or
something weird that the guy's doing.
Who knows?
You know, maybe he's a genius at this sort of thing, but it
would be a hard thing to fake.
I don't think there's much more to be said
about it than that.
But this issue of whether it's fake or not--
one of the other arguments in favor of the notion that there
is a real disorder is imagine you've got 24 personalities or
imagine your parents tell you--
how many parents when you were little made up some sort of
long-running story that they told you?
No?
Oh good.
The rest of you was deprived.
They were just reading out of the books.
Anyway, I used to have a nice
long-running story about bunnies.
Very complicated stuff.
The problem is once there were like 24 bunnies or whatever, I
don't remember how many there were-- the kids would keep
calling me on errors.
No, no, he lives over there.
It's very difficult to keep all this stuff straight.
If you have a story with 24 characters in it that you're
making up as a fake in your own head you've got
to keep that lie.
Well, you don't have to do stories.
Think of a good lie.
How many times when you were a kid did you get stuck because
the lie fell apart because you told it wrong?
You changed the story.
If it's a truth it's easy enough because you just go
back and refer to the Truth and it's just kind of there.
But the lie you have to remember the details of and
there's an argument that the same thing is going on here.
If you really had twenty-four different personalities it'd
be just very difficult to keep them straight unless you were
just reporting on--
so here's Chuck, the personality, who do you know?
I know boom, boom and boom.
If you're faking it--
you-- the owner of this whole story have to think, Chuck,
Chuck-- oh God.
I don't remember who Chuck knows and so on.
Now a more troubling fact perhaps, is that multiple
personality disorder was practically not on the radar
screen twenty years ago.
When I first started talking about multiple personality
disorder I could like read the whole literature on this--
handful of cases from a handful--
a handful of patients from a handful of therapists.
In twenty years it's skyrocketed.
It became sort of flavor of the month, everybody had a
multiple personality disorder for a while.
That's faded off a bit since then, but that's odd.
Why should that be?
One theory is that is that it's a well- intentioned
delusion, cooked up between a therapist and a patient.
Patient's got some real problem, the therapist
believes in multiple personality disorder, and
through the use of hypnosis, which is a common tool for
therapists who treat multiple personality disorder you come
to the conclusion--
you and the therapist come to the conclusion that you have
more than one character rattling around in there.
And that it wasn't real before you came into
the therapist's office.
The counter argument to that is that what brings people in
often is that they're missing chunks of their lives.
You come to the therapist's office.
You say look, I have no idea what I did Tuesday afternoon,
but there's a new dress in my closet and there's a charge on
my Visa card and this is disturbing.
If things were happening to you, you just didn't remember
it might eventually get you into therapy.
AUDIENCE: Well, couldn't multiple personality disorder
popularity skyrocket after that movie came out and
everyone saw it?
PROFESSOR: Oh yes.
To anticipate what I will actually end up getting to do
in next Tuesday's-- since there's no class on Thursday--
there is a sense in which you get to
choose how to go insane.
The culture around you enables certain forms of certain
patterns of mental disorder and not others.
And sure, there's a lot of this sort of copycat cracking
up, if you'd like.
Let me say one last thing about this issue of what gets
people into therapy.
It's one thing to find a dress in your closet.
The sort of thing that drives you to the therapist really
quickly is you wake up in the morning, there's a guy in bed
with you, it's pretty clear that he's been there for
awhile and the suggestion is that you've been doing stuff
of some sort and you don't know who he is.
There's a lovely-- well, lovely-- scary anecdote by one
patient where sort of a case where bad girl/good girl
personalities.
The good girl didn't know the bad girl personality, but the
bad girl knew the good girl and the bad girl in therapy
said, oh, this is great.
She's such a prig.
So I take over and we go out to a bar and pick up a guy.
I bring him home and you know, we do stuff, and then I just
withdraw back into her and watch the next morning.
It was great, man, she'd wake up and she'd freak every time.
Well, you've got to imagine the guy's point of view, too.
You know, guy comes home with somebody, the next morning
she's ranting and raving that she's never seen him before
and kicking him out the door.
It must be very strange for all concerned, but is
certainly the sort of thing that would land you wanting to
talk to somebody in the mental health field.
All right, we'll pick up next week.